

TOKYO GAZETTE

CONTENTS

(Third Division, Board of Information)

January, 1942

TOKYO GAZETTE

A MONTHLY REPORT OF CURRENT POLICIES,
OFFICIAL STATEMENTS AND STATISTICS

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Vol. V No. 7

January, 1942

Published Monthly by the Tokyo Gazette Publishing House

The TOKYO GAZETTE is published monthly by the Tokyo Gazette Publishing House under the supervision of the Board of Information. Its purpose is primarily to supply information concerning the nature of problems being confronted today by the Japanese nation as a whole, and of the governmental steps being taken to solve these problems.

The material in the TOKYO GAZETTE is selected mainly from the *Weekly Report*, edited by the same Board. The accuracy and comprehensiveness of data presented in the *Report* are fully established. For the benefit of students of Japanese affairs, the TOKYO GAZETTE is endeavouring to maintain these qualities in the hope that its publication will eliminate unfortunate misunderstandings and thus contribute to world peace and international goodwill.

Printed in Japan

Doc 7362A

IMPERIAL RESCRIPT

WE, by grace of heaven, Emperor of Japan, seated on the Throne of a line unbroken for ages eternal, enjoin upon ye, Our loyal and brave subjects:

We hereby declare war on the United States of America and the British Empire. The men and officers of Our army and navy shall do their utmost in prosecuting the war. Our public servants of various departments shall perform faithfully and diligently their appointed tasks, and all other subjects of Ours shall pursue their respective duties; the entire nation with a united will shall mobilize their total strength so that nothing will miscarry in the attainment of our war aims.

To insure the stability of East Asia and to contribute to world peace is the far-sighted policy which was formulated by Our Great Illustrious Imperial Grandsire and Our Great Imperial Sire succeeding Him, and which We lay constantly to heart. To cultivate friendship among nations and to enjoy prosperity in common with all nations has always been the guiding principle of Our Empire's foreign policy. It has been truly unavoidable and far from Our wishes that Our Empire has now been brought to cross swords with America and Britain. More than four years have passed since China, failing to comprehend the true intentions of Our Empire, and recklessly courting trouble, disturbed the peace of East Asia and compelled Our Empire to take up arms. Although there has been re-established the National Government of China, with which Japan has effected neighbourly intercourse and cooperation, the régime which has survived at Chungking, relying upon American and British protection, still continues its fratricidal opposition. Eager for the realization of their inordinate ambition to dominate the Orient, both America and Britain, giving support to the

Chungking régime, have aggravated the disturbances in East Asia. Moreover, these two Powers, inducing other countries to follow suit, increased military preparations on all sides of Our Empire to challenge us. They have obstructed by every means our peaceful commerce, and finally resorted to a direct severance of economic relations, menacing gravely the existence of Our Empire. Patiently have We waited and long have We endured, in the hope that Our Government might retrieve the situation in peace. But our adversaries, showing not the least spirit of conciliation, have unduly delayed a settlement; and in the meantime, they have intensified the economic and political pressure to compel thereby Our Empire to submission. This trend of affairs would, if left unchecked, not only nullify Our Empire's efforts of many years for the sake of the stabilization of East Asia, but also endanger the very existence of Our nation. The situation being such as it is, Our Empire for its existence and self-defence has no other recourse but to appeal to arms and to crush every obstacle in its path.

The hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors guarding Us from above, We rely upon the loyalty and courage of Our subjects in Our confident expectation that the task bequeathed by Our Forefathers will be carried forward, and that the sources of evil will be speedily eradicated and an enduring peace firmly established in East Asia, preserving thereby the glory of Our Empire.

The 8th day of the 12th month of the 16th year of Syōwa.

(Imperial Sign Manual. Imperial Seal.)

STATEMENT BY THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

—Issued on December 8, 1941—

An Imperial Rescript declaring war having been graciously granted, the Japanese Government hereby makes an announcement to all the world.

It is the immutable policy of Japan to insure the stability of East Asia and to contribute to the cause of world peace, while the guiding principle of its foreign policy has been to carry out the aforesaid national policy by cultivating friendship with all nations. Unfortunately, the China Affair broke out, owing to the fact that China failed to comprehend Japan's true intentions, and provoked a conflict. But under the august virtue of our Sovereign, our Imperial forces proved victorious wherever they went. All important points in China have now fallen into our hands, and far-sighted Chinese leaders sharing the same views with us have established anew the National Government of China, with which Japan has formed the ties of neighbourly friendship, and which have already been recognized by as many as eleven friendly Powers. Today, the Chungking Government, surviving in the remote interior, can do no more than continue their futile resistance. However, the United States of America and the British Empire, unwilling to alter their senseless policy of keeping East Asia permanently in a servile position, obstructed by all means the settlement of the China Affair. Moreover, they instigated the Netherlands East Indies, menaced French Indo-China and resorted to all possible measures with a view to alienating Japan and Thailand. So busily engaged were these two Powers in frustrating Japan's natural aspiration to promote with these countries of the South the relationship of common prosperity, that it appeared they were about to open a planned attack upon us. Finally, they went so far as to adopt the outrageous measure of severing economic relations with Japan. Between non-belligerent Powers the rupture of economic relations constitutes a hostile action comparable to a challenge by

Japan has no other choice but to go to war with the United States and the British Empire

armed force. Not content even with such an impermissible action, the two Powers, inducing other countries to follow suit, caused the increase of armed forces on all sides of Japan, creating a grave menace to our existence. Despite such menace to the existence of Japan and the stability of East Asia, the Japanese Government, anxious to preserve the peace of the Pacific and to prevent the spread of war-like disturbances to all the world, conducted patiently and prudently for eight long months diplomatic negotiations with the United States. We urged upon the United States, and Britain at its back, and also other countries under the influence of the two Powers, reconsideration of their attitude. We showed the spirit of conciliation as far as it was compatible with both the existence and prestige of our Empire, and we endeavoured toward a peaceful settlement. We tried all that could be tried, and did all that could be done. However, the American Government, toying with utopian principles, refused to recognize the plain realities of East Asia. Blinded by its material strength, it failed to see the real power of Japan. And in conjunction with its associate Powers, the American Government increased military menace in the belief that it could thereby compel Japan's submission. No longer there exists any hope or formula to maintain the peace of the Pacific in cooperation with the United States and associate Powers through the adjustment of our relations with them by peaceful means. The stability of East Asia and the existence of Japan are now in jeopardy. Even today they are directly attacking our armed forces. Such being the situation, an Imperial Rescript declaring war on the United States of America and the British Empire has been issued. The Government is filled with awe on receiving the Imperial Injunction. It is time for us, one hundred million subjects of His Majesty, to stand up resolutely with a unity of will strong as iron, and devote the nation's total strength to the prosecution of the war in order that we may eliminate forever the sources of evil in East Asia and thereby meet the august wishes of our Sovereign.

There remains, glorious as the sun and stars, the Imperial Rescript on Japan's mission to enable all nations to have each its proper place in the world. And immutable is our policy to realize common prosperity of Japan, China and Manchoukuo through the cooperation and collaboration of the three countries, and to lay the foundation for the rise and progress of East Asia. And firm and

unshakable as ever is our national resolve that, in alliance with Germany and Italy sharing the same aspirations with Japan, we should mark a foundation for world peace and march forward toward the construction of a new order. Japan is now obliged newly to take action in the various regions of the South, but it should be stressed that we harbour no hostile intention toward the peoples of those regions. We only desire to do away with the tyranny of America and Britain and to restore East Asia to its proper and undefiled state of existence and share in the enjoyment of common prosperity with them all. We are convinced that the peoples of these regions will understand Japan's true intentions and look forward to a new beginning of life in a new East Asia.

The rise or fall of our Empire, and the progress or decline of East Asia, depend upon the present war. All our people, mindful of the origin and the mission of this campaign, should not act rashly nor be neglectful. But through our industry and endurance we should prove worthy of the best traditions of our forefathers.

Looking up to the brilliant accomplishments of those in history who turned every crisis into an opportunity of furthering our national fortune, we should pledge ourselves to assist in the noble and far-sighted Imperial policy, and to attain the aims of the present campaign and to set thereby our Sovereign's mind forever at ease.

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ON RECEIVING THE IMPERIAL RESCRIPT

—Radio Address by the Prime Minister Delivered on
December 8, 1941—

JUST now an Imperial Rescript declaring war has been granted. At this very moment our brave military and naval forces are defying death in the field of battle.

In spite of all that our Empire has done, ardently desiring the preservation of the general peace of East Asia, our efforts have ended in a failure.

The Government has employed every means at its disposal in its endeavour to bring about a successful adjustment of Japanese-American relations. But the United States refused to make the least concession, and instead joining in league with Britain, the Netherlands and Chungking, demanded unilateral concessions on our part, such as unconditional and wholesale evacuation of our military and naval forces from China, non-recognition of the Nanking Government, and the annulment of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy. Even then, we have continued to the last our efforts to reach a peaceful settlement. But the United States has shown no sign of reconsidering its own attitude. Should we submit to such imposition, the prestige of our Empire would be compromised. It would mean not only a failure to settle the China Affair, but it would also result in endangering the very existence of our Empire.

Things having come to this pass, Japan is now obliged to go to war in order to surmount the present crisis and to defend itself and to preserve itself.

On reading the Imperial Rescript, I am filled with awe and trepidation. Powerless as I am, I am resolved to dedicate myself, body and soul, to the country, and to set at ease the august mind of our Sovereign. And I believe that every one of you, my fellow countrymen, will not care for your life, but gladly share in the honour to make of yourself "His Majesty's humble shield."

The "key to victory" lies in a "faith in victory." For 2600 years since it was founded, our Empire has never known a defeat.

ON RECEIVING THE IMPERIAL RESCRIPT

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This record alone is enough to produce a conviction in our ability to crush any enemy no matter how strong. Let us pledge ourselves that we will never stain our glorious history but go forward to construct even a greater Japan of tomorrow. It is true, we have shown until today the maximum measure of patience and endurance. But that is not because we sought ease and comfort, or because we feared the power and size of our enemy. It is only because we desired to preserve the peace of the world, and to prevent a calamity from befalling the mankind. However, now that our enemy has challenged us and threatens the existence and prestige of our fatherland, we cannot but stand up with resolution.

Our adversaries, boasting rich natural resources, aim at the domination of the world. In order to annihilate this enemy and to construct an unshakable new order of East Asia, we should anticipate naturally a long war. At the same time it requires, needless to say, a tremendous amount of constructive energy. We must march on, surmounting every possible obstacle, with a firm conviction in the final victory. This is a heaven-sent opportunity to test the mettle of us Japanese of the Syowa Era. Only by undergoing this test successfully, may we deserve the honour to be hailed by posterity as builders of the Greater East Asia.

Happily at this moment, the alliance with Germany and Italy and the relationship of "One virtue and one mind" which binds Japan with Manchoukuo and China, are growing stronger than ever.

The rise or fall of our Empire and the prosperity or ruin of East Asia literally depend upon the outcome of this war. Truly it is time for the one hundred million of us Japanese to dedicate all we have and sacrifice everything for our country's cause. As long as there remains under the policy of *Hakkō Ichiu* this great spirit of loyalty and patriotism, we have nothing to fear in fighting America and Britain. Victory, I am convinced, is always with the illustrious virtues of our Sovereign. In making known these humble views of mine, I join with all my countrymen in pledging myself to assist in the grand Imperial enterprise.

MEIJI SHRINE NATIONAL ATHLETIC MEET

DEPARTMENT OF WELFARE

JAPAN'S devotion to athletics was eloquently demonstrated during the 12th Meiji Shrine National Athletic Meet, held for four days beginning with October 31, 1941. During that spectacular rally of physical strength, the stadium in the outer garden of the shrine was transformed into a dynamic hub of activities. The function was staged with the object of commemorating the august life and work of the Emperor Meiji, of prompting the national spirit and of improving the physical strength of the Japanese people—an affair appropriately reflecting the spirit of the present time. It was graced by the presence of His Imperial Highness Prince Takamatsu, who was the Honorary President of the Athletic Meet.

Besides successfully adding an epocal chapter to the athletic annals of Japan, the occasion proved its significant worth under the prevailing international tension through the performance of a crop of unusual feats of national skill. The number of items in the programme were 21 in all, *kendo* (Japanese fencing), bayonet fighting, *judo* (ju-jitsu), archery, *sumo* (Japanese wrestling), horse riding, shooting, national defence tournament, route march, glider flying, mass physical exercise, field and track events, football, rugby, baseball, volley-ball, basket-ball, boat-race, tennis, gymnastics and bicycle-race.

Despite the intensity of the current emergency, about 35,000 Japanese athletes from all centres of the country took part in the demonstration. Many residing in Manchoukuo, China and Mongolia also participated, revealing that the ceremony was most fitting to mark the celebration of the holiday festivities commemorating the anniversary of the great Emperor.

The special feature of the 12th National Athletic Meet was that the athletes were qualified to take part in the event not only by the records they accomplished but by their showings in the test for physical strength. According to this method, all participants of 14 to 24 years of age must possess a standard physical constitution to




AT THE NATIONAL ATHLETIC MEET

Upper, His Imperial Highness Prince Takamatsu attending the meet as Honorary President, accompanied by Her Imperial Highness Princess Takamatsu; lower, all participants arriving in the Meiji Shrine stadium for the occasion



Top, Maanto Tajima of Berlin Olympic fame appearing in running broad jump at the meet; right, an exhibition of group exercise, which was another feature event on the programme



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endure a prescribed form of physical strength test. The athletic authorities tentatively included in the list of items for this year's eligibility test the ability to finish 100-metre race in 17 seconds, 2,000-metre run in 10 minutes, to cover 3.8 metres in running broad jump and 30 metres in hand-grenade throwing, to finish 30-kilogramme weight carrying race for 50 metres in 15 seconds, and to chin four times on the horizontal bar.

The introduction of physical power test as the essential requirement for eligibility is due to a desire to prevent the athletes' tendency to mainly train themselves in some feats in which they aspire to become proficient, ignoring the importance of developing their basic physical strength. The athletic authorities, therefore, have adopted the new ruling as a measure to encourage them to train themselves in the performances they wish to specialize, simultaneously developing well-balanced basic physical virility.

With all the athletes in the best of condition, spirited contests were staged in field and track events, baseball, tennis, boat-race and so forth, but particular mention may be made of the route march and glider events as the two most unique and interesting features of the Meet. The march exercise was classified into senior and junior groups and was performed by some 500 mountaineers, the former covering 60 kilometres in a round trip by way of Mt. Oyama and Mt. Tuda in Kanagawa prefecture and the latter making a round trip by way of the Tama Imperial Mausoleum totalling a distance of 45 kilometres.

The glider sport took place at the central glider training field of the Japan Aviation Association in the suburbs of Itoiyato, Ibaraki prefecture, commencing at 9 a. m. on November 1. Three types of gliders, representing three grades of skill, were operated for staging thrilling contests, and the participants performed many breath-holding stunts at an altitude of more than 700 metres, disclosing that Japan has already attained a high degree of progress in this branch of aviation.

It was a great honour and privilege for the Japanese athletes to have competed in the outer garden of the Meiji Shrine in the presence of His Imperial Highness Prince Takamatsu, Honorary President, mobilizing their spiritual and physical energy to the last limit for the exhibition of their sportsmanship. With such functions and activities, the Athletic Meet was of a special significance,

contributing very greatly toward the improvement of the physical strength of the nation.

In the past, physical training was chiefly a matter of individual recreation and taste, and as such one might or might not have taken interest in it; those who were fond of it were prone to concentrate their efforts in establishing high records merely for their own gratification. But the development of physical strength is no longer a question that may be left to the individual discretion. It has become a duty of each individual to increase his or her physical ability to the highest possible extent to render service to the nation. In this sense, therefore, the 12th National Athletic Meet adopted "Serving the State through Physical Strength" as its motto, making the function a practical movement for attaining the objective. The Athletic Meet this year, therefore, was truly a physical education festival of the people instead of merely being a colourful display of feats and sports by champion sportsmen selected by local athletic organizations.

In concert with the national event in Tokyo, some 12,000 provincial athletic organizations promoted athletic events in all parts of the country. In appreciation of this occasion, the Prime Minister, General Hideki Tojo, made the following remark in his congratulatory address:

"There is no example, in the ancient or modern history of the world, of a nation which had declined and fallen when its people were full of excellent health, physical strength and national spirit. Japan at the height of prosperity today must accomplish its appointed task, and work out its national destiny for a glorious future. I believe and expect that you, who are keenly conscious of this great responsibility and firmly determined to render your self-denying service to the country, will make your best efforts to cultivate a vigorous and indomitable spirit and virile and sturdy bodies for the accomplishment of your task in the manner worthy of the Japanese subjects."

JAPAN'S ECONOMY GROWS IN STRENGTH

—Address of Mr. Okinori Kaya, Minister of Finance,
Delivered before the Diet on November 17, 1941—

HAVING been placed in charge of the financial affairs when the present Cabinet was installed in office recently, I deem it a rare privilege to be invited, at this opportunity, to explain the outline of the proposed supplementary appropriations for the Special Account of the Extraordinary Military Expenditures and for the General Account for the 1941-42 fiscal year and to give expression to the views of the Government as I see them, on our financial and economic conditions.

Outlines of Additional Budgets

The supplementary budgets now before the House consist of total estimated expenditures of 3,800,000,000 yen in the Special Account for the Extraordinary Military Expenditures and 115,900,000 yen¹ in the General Account. Of these two items, the extraordinary war estimates are intended to cover such additional expenses as are urgently required by the army and navy for ensuring a satisfactory settlement of the China Affair in the face of the prevailing critical situation. To meet these supplementary war expenditures, our estimated revenue includes 214,500,000 yen to be transferred from the General Account, 14,300,000 yen from various special accounts, 3,170,000,000 yen from the proceeds of public loans and borrowings and 1,000,000 yen from other sources.

In the General Account the supplementary budget covers only such urgent expenditure, which cannot be dispensed with in view of the prevailing situation, as the increased transfer to the Special Account for the Extraordinary Military Expenditures, expenses required for encouraging rice production, increased expenses for securing the supply of important chemical fertilizers, expenses for reorganizing smaller commercial and industrial enterprises, expenses

¹ Figures in this address are given mostly in round numbers.

attendant upon the organization of the Industrial Equipment Corporation, expenses for eliminating the flood damages in the Kanto and other districts, expenses for coping with the cold-wave damages in Hokkaido and the northeastern provinces and increase in the reserve funds of the Treasury. These supplementary appropriations in the General Account are proposed to be covered by such sources as estimated increases in the stamp and tax revenue amounting to 173,100,000 yen, and the proceeds of the Government enterprises accruing from the recent raise in the prices of tobacco, etc., which is expected to amount to 41,400,000 yen and estimated excesses of revenue over expenditure, due to retrenchment in the execution of the General Budget for the current fiscal year.

We have also proposed some appropriations for the various special accounts as it has been found imperative to make expenditure in order to encourage rice production in Tyosen and Taiwan and to meet other urgent needs. The proposed raise in taxation is to be effected in Japan proper and overseas territories alike chiefly in indirect taxes on such consumption goods as are deemed luxurious or comparatively non-urgent in national life, and this measure is aimed at absorbing the people's purchasing power so as to economize consumption and invigorate national spirit and increase the revenue for the Treasury at the same time. The recent raise of tobacco prices and the proposed raise of the railway tariff owe their origin to similar reasons.

Present Conditions of Japan's Finances

Next, I wish to touch upon the financial and economic conditions of our country. For the past four and a half years since the outbreak of the China Affair, large forces of the Imperial Army, Navy and Air Arm have continued to see active service. But in spite of this fact, the finances of our country remain quite sound and no difficulty has yet been felt in meeting the needs of the Treasury, while the economic resources of our nation have rather been augmented in all fields.

The recent growth of our national finances may be seen from the fact that, during the four fiscal years since the outbreak of the China Affair in 1937, inclusive of 1941-42, our national budgets have totalled more than 48,000 million yen, including 16,000 million yen

in the Extraordinary Military Expenditures. Together they far exceed the grand total of our Government expenditures for the seven decades from the Restoration of 1868. Meanwhile, the tax revenue and the proceeds from Government enterprises during the past four years have totalled 15,000 million yen, including the 1941-42 estimates. The last amount includes a sum of approximately 4,500 million yen, which has been estimated for the 1941-42 fiscal year in the tax revenue and proceeds from Government enterprises, whereas the corresponding figure for the 1936-37 fiscal year was only 1,200 million yen, or about one-fourth the 1941-42 figure. Apart from these sources of revenue, public loans have yielded a total of 24,100 million yen since the beginning of the Affair. That these huge budgets have been made to work without any appreciable hitch certainly affords an eloquent proof of the rapid growth which our national finances have made during the past few years.

Remarkable Growth in Economic Strength

The finances of a State being based on its national economic strength, it is only too obvious that Japan has made remarkable growth in its economic strength to keep pace with the recent expansion of our national finances since the outbreak of the China Affair. From olden times, it has been considered customary for a nation to weaken in economic strength in time of war, but nevertheless our national economic power has grown considerably in spite of the current armed conflict. In this connection I take this opportunity to give a brief explanation on the natural resources, equipment for production and funds, which together make up the economic strength of our nation.

In point of natural resources, it goes without saying that the development of natural resources in this country has been greatly expedited since the outbreak of the hostilities. Worthy of special note, in this connection, is the fact that an increasingly close economic cooperation has been effected between Japan, Manchoukuo and China, with the inexhaustible natural resources on the Asiatic mainland serving to reinforce the defence economy for the construction of a new order in East Asia. Among other natural resources, North China is generally credited with approximately 200,000 million tons of coal deposits, or about ten times those believed to exist throughout

the entire territory of Japan. This single instance may be sufficient to show how the economic resources of Japan, Manchoukuo and China have become vastly strengthened due to the recent cooperation between the three nations with Japan as its nucleus. Moreover, our trade with French Indo-China, Thailand and other East Asiatic countries other than Manchoukuo and China has also grown considerably in volume, thereby further augmenting the sources of war and civilian supplies for Japan.

As for our productive equipment, various facilities for production and transportation have been greatly expanded in Manchoukuo and China as well as in Japan during the past few years of the China Affair, our nation having invested an estimated total of 23,000 million yen in Japan, Manchoukuo and China for the purpose of expanding productive capacity as compared with 4,000 million yen estimated to have been invested for similar purposes during the preceding four years. The former figures represent an increase of more than five times over the latter. Such expansion of the means of production has been effected with a special emphasis on those industries which are deemed of most urgent necessity in the prevailing situation.

In time of war, the economic power of a nation often wanes due to the loss to the enemy of areas where an important portion of its natural resources and means of production are located, or due to the destruction by the enemy of various facilities of production and transportation. During the current hostilities, not a single inch of our territory has been invaded by the enemy, nor has any of our facilities of production been damaged by a single shot, thanks to the august virtue of His Imperial Majesty and the renowned valour of the officers and men of the Imperial Army and Navy. Our ally, Manchoukuo, also remains not a whit adversely affected by the China Affair. The result is that Japan's economic power has not been impaired in the least, while her cooperation with the East Asiatic nations has become closer than ever, thereby strengthening our national defence economy, a prolonged hostility notwithstanding.

Favourable Wartime Finances and Economy

It goes without saying that for the supply of necessary funds for our national finances and economy, we have to depend upon the

savings of the people, which have continued to increase, indicating the correct appreciation of the prevailing situation in which they are placed. Indeed the people's savings did exceed the mark set by the Government every year during the present Affair in spite of the fact that the people's tax burden has increased enormously during the interval. Thus, during the period from the beginning of the China Affair up to September, 1941, the Japanese people are estimated to have saved a total of approximately 41,000 million yen, or about five times the similar figures for the pre-Affair four years, which were only 8,000 million yen, and it is really gratifying to note such readiness on the part of the people to undertake the task.

As a result, out of the public loans issued to finance the China Affair, some 20,000 million yen, or 83 per cent of the total, has already been digested, thus providing well-nigh sufficient financial resources to cover the total amount of 23,000 million yen invested in order to facilitate the proposed expansion of productive capacity of Japan, Manchoukuo and China.

In the past instances of major wars in world history, rises in money interest and fluctuations in foreign exchange have always proved inevitable, but Japan has been obviously an exception to this rule; for in our country both money interest and foreign exchange have been securely stabilized in keeping with the policy of the Government instead of evincing any sign of instability, a fact bespeaking the favourable development which our wartime finances and economy are making. During the China hostilities certain Powers have been inclined to underestimate our people's resources, both spiritual and economic, and have chosen to bring various economic pressures to bear upon our nation in a vain hope that our country would soon exhaust all its strength. Contrary to their expectation, however, just the reverse has proved to be the case and we have attained most satisfactory results as has just been reviewed. I cannot but deem it a matter for an unqualified congratulation to be able to ascribe these results to the whole-hearted cooperation rendered by our 100 million people for the national cause.

Future of War Economy and National Life

It is true that, with the progress of the China Affair, the supply of materials for civilian consumption has gradually become less

abundant, but such a trend is a natural sequel to the operation of wartime economy inasmuch as a considerable portion of the means of production for civilian consumption has been diverted to those channels for the proposed expansion of productive capacity as well as those for war supplies. Therefore, it would be a gross mistake to take the phenomenon just referred to as a criterion by which to measure our economic strength. It may also be noted that even the present supply for civilian consumption goods in our country still has an ample margin if we remember the experiences of the Powers in large-scale wars, such as the last World War.

For all this, it is an undeniable fact that the recent action on the part of the British Empire, the United States and the Netherlands East Indies to freeze Japanese assets, an action tantamount to the severance of economic relations with our country, has seriously affected our national economy which had still been maintaining considerably close relations with those Powers. In view of this situation, our nation will now have to establish a self-sufficient economic sphere on the basis of the relationship of co-existence among the East Asiatic countries and build up sufficient armaments and adequate economic strength to maintain and operate such armaments so as to be able to repulse all undue attempts at disturbing the East Asian order.

To attain this objective will be a gigantic task which can be accomplished only when all members of the nation really get united and make redoubled efforts for that specific purpose. And in order to bring the all-out power of our nation into the fullest possible play, the Government are determined to make all their measures fit in smoothly and appropriately with the working of our wartime economy and establish an effective control on the economic activities of the people so as to be able to carry out steadily all necessary reforms and plans. Meanwhile the people should, with a full cognizance of the prevailing situation, work harder than ever to enhance productive capacity and hold down their consumption of materials to the minimum sufficient to maintain and promote the home front activities, preserve their health and pursue their academic studies and technical training. All the margins thus created in materials and funds should be used in strengthening national defence and amplifying productive capacity. Always bearing in mind the necessity to stabilize and preserve the life on

the home-front, the Government are determined to leave no stone unturned in endeavouring to stabilize commodity prices and securing the necessary supply of material indispensable for the daily life of the people.

The Government also are steadily making all necessary preparations in financial measures to provide for emergency. Under the circumstances, the people are expected to repose full confidence in the Government in coping with the situation, whatever may be in store for our future.

Needless to say, all policies and measures which a nation takes in time of war can be crowned with satisfactory results only when they are loyally supported by their national spirit and national morale. Now our nation stands at the cross-roads of rise or fall. Once overcoming this crisis, we shall have every prospect of bringing about an epochal rise in our national fortune and introducing stability throughout East Asia. Now is the very moment when all our people are in duty bound to do their very utmost for the cause of their country. It is my sincere hope that our 100 million people, inspired by our appointed task of accomplishing the sacred task of constructing a new Asia in the face of all conceivable difficulties, will make concerted efforts to that end. In conclusion, I earnestly request you speedily to consent to the budgetary estimates introduced by the Government.

SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS

—Published by the Japanese Government on December 8, 1941—

1. Negotiations between the Governments of Japan and the United States of America were begun at Washington in spring of this year. In the middle of April, the American Government submitted an informal draft proposal. It contained stipulations on the following items:

1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.
2. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.
3. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.
4. Commerce between both nations.
5. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.
6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.
7. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

The proposal was intended to serve as a basis for a general agreement concerning the questions of the entire Pacific area. But the proposal contained a number of points unacceptable to the Japanese Government. For instance, with reference to the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy, the American Government asked the Japanese Government to give an undertaking not to menace the security of the United States when the latter should participate in the European war on the plea of self-defence. Again, as regards the China Affair, the American Government would undertake to use its good offices for the initiation of peace negotiations between the Japanese Government and the Chungking régime on such terms as were acceptable to the United States.

Accordingly, the Japanese Government sent a counter-proposal in the middle of May, modifying the American proposal. Concerning the Tripartite Pact it was explicitly stated that Japan's obligation to render military assistance would arise as stipulated under the said

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treaty, while with regard to the China Affair, it was provided that the American Government, accepting the premises of the three Konoe Principles, the Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty and the Joint Declaration of Japan, Manchoukuo and China, and relying upon Japan's policy of neighbourly friendship would urge upon the Chungking régime to enter into negotiations with the Japanese Government for the restoration of peace, and it was further stipulated that in case Chungking refused to accept the American advice, the United States was to cease from aiding the Chungking régime. Negotiations were continued further when in the latter part of June a new counter-proposal was submitted by the American Government, which, as compared with its proposal of April, set forth American claims in a more concrete manner. Discussions were continued to be held, revolving round this June proposal.

2. In July, soon after the formation of the third Konoe Cabinet the Japanese Government took measures of joint defence of French Indo-China in accordance with the Protocol concluded between Japan and France, whereupon the American Government applied economic pressure by freezing Japanese assets. But the Japanese Government still hoped for a peaceful settlement, and in August Premier Prince Konoe sent a personal message to President Roosevelt, setting forth fully the peaceful intentions of Japan, and proposing a meeting without delay between the responsible heads of the two Governments with a view to averting the crisis in the relations of the two countries. While accepting in principle the Konoe proposal, the American Government stoutly maintained its stand that it could not see its way to putting it into practice unless an agreement of view had been first reached on the pending issues, especially on the questions of the Tripartite Pact, the stationing of Japanese troops in China, and the non-discriminatory treatment in international commerce; and moreover, it held fast to its June proposal, refusing to make any concession. Accordingly, the Japanese Government submitted on September 6 a proposal, followed by yet another proposal submitted on September 23 which took into account the American proposal of June and incorporated Japanese claims. Negotiations were continued until October 2, when the American Government requested clarification of Japan's intentions regarding the application of the four principles long advocated by the United States as fundamental principles of international relations,

namely:

1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations.
2. Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity.
4. Non-disturbance of the *status quo* in the Pacific except as the *status quo* may be altered by peaceful means.

At the same time, it demanded the Japanese Government to clarify further its views concerning the three questions mentioned above. As a result, the negotiations struck an impasse. In the meantime the Kono Cabinet resigned in the middle of October.

Such divergence of view as above mentioned between the two Governments was produced largely because the American Government obstinately adhered to utopian principles based on selfish views for dealing with international relations, and insisted upon the application thereof in China and elsewhere, regardless of the real conditions of East Asia. It was evident that so long as the American Government persisted in that attitude, there was little chance of bringing negotiations to a successful conclusion.

3. The present Cabinet in its solicitude for the peace of the Pacific decided to continue the negotiation. With a view to effecting a settlement on an equitable basis, the Japanese Government formulated the following proposal concerning the three principal issues in the negotiations; namely, (1) the right of self-defence in connection with the Tripartite Pact, (2) non-discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and (3) evacuation of troops from China and French Indo-China.

1. The American Government undertakes not to enlarge unduly the meaning of "self-defence."

2. The Japanese Government recognizes the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations to be applied to all the Pacific area, including China, on the understanding that the said principle is to be applied uniformly to the rest of the world.

3. Following the restoration of peace between Japan and China, the Japanese troops despatched to China in connection with the China Affair will be stationed for the necessary duration

in specified areas, and the rest of the troops will be withdrawn upon the conclusion of peace and in accordance with the agreement between Japan and China. The troops in French Indo-China will be withdrawn immediately either upon the settlement of the China Affair or the establishment of peace in East Asia on an equitable basis.

Negotiations were conducted on the basis of the above proposal. Meanwhile the Japanese Government requested the American Government to use its good offices, upon the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, for the conclusion of a similar understanding with Great Britain and other countries concerning relevant subjects. Moreover, in order to do the utmost in the negotiation, Japan dispatched Ambassador Kuruu posthaste to Washington to assist Admiral Nomura.

On the other hand, the American Government repeatedly urged that there would be no need for Japan to maintain the Tripartite Pact after the consummation of a Japanese-American agreement, and expressed its hope that the said treaty would cease to exist or become a dead letter. As regards the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce, the American Government, insisting on its unconditional application to China, proposed the economic development of China jointly by the Powers. To this proposal the Japanese Government replied to the effect that with regard to the commercial non-discrimination principle, Japan hoped for its application throughout the world and that it would recognize its application to China in accordance with the realization of this principle throughout the world, and also that the American proposal for the joint international development of China was unacceptable to Japan as it would open the way for the joint international control of China. On these grounds, the Japanese Government requested the American Government to withdraw the proposal in question.

4. On November 17 and thereafter Admiral Nomura, together with Ambassador Kuruu, repeatedly met the American President and Secretary of State and strongly urged upon the latter two the necessity of bringing about speedily an amicable conclusion of the negotiation. Discussions were extended over a few meetings at which the President stated that he was prepared to act as an "introducer" of peace between Japan and Chungking, and the Secretary of State emphasized, that, Japanese-American negotiations

would prove difficult as long as Japan cooperated with Germany, and it was necessary to remove this fundamental difficulty. Despite these discussions, it became clear that the difficulty lay as before in the questions of the Tripartite Pact, of the international commercial-non-discriminatory treatment and of China. In order to avert the rupture of diplomatic relations between the two countries, the Japanese Government, presented on November 20, the following new proposal calculated to achieve an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions.

1. Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to make any armed advancement into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the South Eastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

2. The Governments of Japan and the United States shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which the two countries need in the Netherlands East Indies.

3. The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of the assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan a required quantity of oil.

4. The Government of the United States undertakes not to indulge in measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

5. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area.

The Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

Regarding the above proposal, the Secretary of State contended that it was impossible for the American Government to accept Item 4 of our proposal and cease aiding the Chiang Kai-shek régime unless Japan clarified her relations with the Tripartite Pact and gave assurances regarding her adoption of a peaceful policy, and that the President's offer to act as "introducer" of Sino-Japanese peace was

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predicated upon Japan's adoption of a peaceful policy. Thereupon, the Japanese Government instructed the two Ambassadors to request reconsideration by the American Government, pointing out to the Secretary of State that, in case direct negotiations were opened between Japan and Chungking through "introduction" by the President, the continuation of aid to the Chiang Kai-shek régime by the United States, the peace introducer, would constitute an interference with the realization of peace, and that the American contention was therefore inconsistent.

5. Meanwhile, the American Government consulted with the representatives of Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and Chungking, and on November 22 the Secretary of State told our two Ambassadors that withdrawal of troops from southern French Indo-China alone would not be enough to ease the tense situation in the Southern Pacific and that he considered the time was not yet ripe for the so-called "introduction" of peace between Japan and Chungking by the President.

Subsequently, the American Government continued consultations with the representatives of the Powers above-referred to and on November 25 the Secretary of State presented to our Ambassadors, as a basis for future negotiations, a proposal to the following effect, stating that, although the American Government had carefully studied the Japanese proposal of the 20th and consulted with the countries concerned, they could not unfortunately bring themselves to agree to our proposal.

(A) In the new proposal, the American Government reiterated, with reference to political relations, the above-mentioned four principles as the fundamental principles to be practically applied to mutual relations between Japan and the United States. However, it changed Item 4 to "the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes." As regards economic relations, the American Government elaborated the third political principle concerning the equality of opportunity and equal treatment in commerce.

(B) As measures to be adopted by the Governments of Japan and the United States it proposed as follows:

(i) The Government of the United States and the Government

of Japan will endeavour to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.

(ii) Both Governments will endeavour to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherlands and Thai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indo-China and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indo-China, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question.

Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indo-China and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indo-China.

(iii) The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indo-China.

(iv) The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support—militarily, politically, economically—any Government or régime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

(v) Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

Both Governments will endeavour to obtain the agreement of the British and other Governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

(vi) The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most favoured-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

(vii) The Government of the United States and the Government

of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.

(viii) Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

(ix) Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

(x) Both Governments will use their influence to cause other Governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement.

Regarding the above proposal, our Ambassadors refuted the American claims pointing out their unreasonableness. But the Secretary of State failed to show any sign of concession and on November 27 the President told our two Ambassadors that, although he still hoped for an amicable conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiations, he considered that it would be futile to try to surmount the crisis by a *modus vivendi* so long as the fundamental policies of the two countries were not in accord.

The Japanese Government, therefore, requested reconsideration of the American Government, because, despite the fact that our proposal of November 20 was made after fully considering the claims of both sides on the most equitable basis, the American Government, maintaining that it could not agree to this proposal, made a new proposal which entirely ignored the realities in East Asia and in particular completely changed its attitude with respect to the China question—a fact which led the Japanese Government to doubt the sincerity of the American Government. On December 2, however, the American Under-Secretary of State Welles, stating that he was acting under Presidential order, made an inquiry to our Government regarding our true intentions, saying that, according to their information, movements and reinforcement of Japanese troops were recently taking place in the region of French Indo-China. To this inquiry, the Japanese Government replied that, in view of the recent

marked activities of the Chungking forces in the neighbourhood of the frontier between French Indo-China and China, Japan had made partial reinforcement of its troops in northern French Indo-China as a precautionary measure and that this naturally had resulted in movement of the troops in the southern area. Meanwhile the American Government rapidly reinforced the encircling front against Japan and led public opinion to its own advantage and thus prepared the ground with a view to meeting the situation arising from the rupture of the negotiations.

6. The Japanese Government made clear its attitude regarding the above-mentioned American proposal in its Memorandum to the American Government under date of December 7, the full text of which is published separately.

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**MEMORANDUM TO THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT,
DATED DECEMBER 8, 1941**

1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to find each its proper place in the world.

Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy.

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking régime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia. Exerting pressure on the Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its Protocol with France took measures of joint defence of French Indo-China, both the American and British Governments, wilfully misinterpreted it as a threat to their own possessions and inducing the Netherlands Government to follow

D.

suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the Empire.

Nevertheless, to facilitate a speedy settlement, the Prime Minister of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, the American Government, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental and essential questions.

3. Subsequently, on September 25 the Japanese Government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American Government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present Cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American Government, adhering steadfastly to its original assertions, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress. Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20 still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions, which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the South Eastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.

(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.

(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "introducer" of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

The American Government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as the so-called "introducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally on November 26, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese Government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American Government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.

4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties. As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude. As for the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual

practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third Powers pursued on an equitable basis. Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese Government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation. It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American Government.

On the other hand, the American Government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American Government and the Japanese Government desires to call the attention of the American Government especially to the following points:

(1) The American Government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favourable to it and urges upon the Japanese Government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

Of the various principles put forward by the American Government as a basis of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese Government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions, it seems only a utopian ideal, on the part of the American Government, to attempt to force their immediate adoption.

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.

(2) The American proposal contains a stipulation which

states: "Both Governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third Powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area." It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restraining Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the War. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defence, Germany and Italy—two Powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area through peaceful means.

(3) Whereas the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned, as it is at times more inhumane than military pressure.

(4) It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great Britain and other Powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that the countries of East Asia for the past hundred years or more have been compelled to observe the *status quo* under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice themselves to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

The stipulation proposed by the American Government

relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. That the six countries—Japan, the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, China and Thailand—excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the Governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese Government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the Nine Power Treaty structure which is the chief factor responsible for the present predicament of East Asia.

(5) All the items demanded of Japan by the American Government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce ignore the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American Government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any régime other than the régime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking Government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of the American Government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking régime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American Government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the yen and dollar exchange, or the abolition of extraterritorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the Empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese Government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

6. The Japanese Government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American Government. However, since the American Government has made the proposal of November 26 as a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and Chungking, and presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking régime on the questions of China, it must be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a new order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiation. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that, in view of the attitude of the American Government, it can not but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

15.5 #

CONCERNING AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN JAPAN,
GERMANY AND ITALY

—Announcement by the Board of Information Made on December 11,
1941, with Respect to Their Joint Prosecution of War against
the United States and the British Empire, Abstinence
from Concluding Peace and Cooperation for
the Establishment of a New Order—

Germany and Italy having decided to wage war in common with
Japan against the United States of America, an agreement was
signed today (December 11) at Berlin between the Japanese Pleni-
potentiary, the Ambassador to Germany, Lieutenant General Hiro-
shi Oshima, the German Plenipotentiary, the Foreign Minister, Mr.
Joachim Ribbentrop and the Italian Plenipotentiary, the Ambassador
to the Germany, Mr. Dino Alfieri. The contents of the agreement
are as follows:

Agreement between Japan, Germany and Italy

In the inflexible determination not to lay down arms until the
common war against the United States and the British Empire is
successfully concluded, the Imperial Japanese Government, the
German Government and the Italian Government have agreed upon
the following stipulations.

ARTICLE 1

Japan, Germany and Italy shall prosecute the war forced upon
them by the United States of America and the British Empire with
all forceful means at their command until it ends in their victory.

ARTICLE 2

Japan, Germany and Italy pledge that, without complete under-
standing between themselves, they will not conclude armistice or
peace with either the United States of America or the British
Empire.

ARTICLE 3

Japan, Germany and Italy shall, even after the termination of the
war in their victory, cooperate most closely for the purpose of

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realizing a righteous new order in the meaning of the Tripartite
Pact which they concluded on September 27, 1940.

ARTICLE 4

The present Agreement shall come into effect on the date of its
signature and shall remain in force as long as the Tripartite Pact of
September 27, 1940 is in force. The High Contracting Parties
shall, at an appropriate time before the expiration of the said period
of validity, reach an understanding concerning the manner of sub-
sequent cooperation provided in Article 3 of the present Agree-
ment.

Jap version in Dec 17, 1941, ~~read in~~
of Asahi Shimbun.

JAPAN'S FOREIGN RELATIONS IN 1941

THIRD DIVISION, BOARD OF INFORMATION

I

IN our review of Japan's foreign relations a year ago, we referred to the move of the United States "as the most vital factor in determining our future action . . . not only in connection with Pacific affairs but also with the European War." Certainly during the year 1941, which was the fifth year of the China Affair and the third year of the European conflict, American moves, particularly since the outbreak of the German-Soviet War, formed a principal factor in creating an extremely grave world situation.

In our part of the world, however, long strides were made toward the solution of the China Affair and the establishment of a new order, through the improvement of relations with the countries of East Asia, including French Indo-China and Thailand, as well as the Soviet Union.

In Europe, also, the European new order was emerging with the advance of the German army into Bulgaria, the conclusion of the Turkish-Bulgarian Pact of Non-aggression, and the conquest of Yugoslavia and Greece—an achievement which brought the Balkans completely under Axis influence. On the other hand, the most grave situation since the outbreak of the present European war developed with the gradual spread of war to Iraq, Syria and Iran in Western Asia and the opening of the German-Soviet hostilities—long looked upon as unavoidable—which developed into a bloody and exhausting struggle along the entire front extending for over two thousand kilometres from Finland in the north and the Black Sea in the south.

In the face of these developments the United States decided to strengthen her aid to Soviet Russia and Chungking while at the same time launching on a programme of out-and-out aid to Britain, thereby creating a situation equivalent to virtual participation in the war. The situation was further aggravated by such steps as the passage through Congress of the Lend-Lease Bill, the promotion of Pan-American joint defence; the landing of military forces in

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Iceland, the participation in the tripartite conference between the United States, the Soviet-Union and Great Britain, the Presidential order to shoot axis naval craft on sight, and the amendment of the Neutrality Act which enabled American merchant ships to be armed and to enter the zone of combat.

Mediation in the Thailand-French Indo-China Dispute

With this international situation as a general background, our foreign relations during the year 1941 commenced with the Japanese proposal of mediation in the border dispute between Thailand and French Indo-China. To this, both countries replied, on January 24, intimating their willingness to accept the Japanese proposal. Thereupon, on January 29, a truce conference was held on board a Japanese warship off Saigon, and this paved the way for a peaceful solution of the dispute, which was reached after three months of conflict. In the meantime, the Japanese Government had been conducting diplomatic negotiations with officials of both French Indo-China and the Netherlands East-Indies concerning commercial and economic matters and facing a situation having an important bearing upon Japan's relations with the South Seas regions. These diplomatic negotiations, however, were really of such a nature as would bring peace to the South Seas region and would not have led to the alleged "Far Eastern Crisis."

In spite of this fact, rumours of a so-called Far Eastern Crisis were spread tenaciously throughout the world as if with the intention of interfering with or cutting short the Japanese Government's efforts at mediation in this border dispute and her economic negotiations with the countries of the South Seas. This is amply attested to by the emphasis placed on the "impending crisis" by the Australian Prime Minister, the concentration of British troops on the borders of Thailand, the mining of the waters around Singapore, and the holding of a military conference between the United States, Great Britain, Australia and the Dutch East-Indies.

In the midst of this tense situation, the mediation conference for the settlement of the border dispute which had been going on in Tokyo since February 7, finally reached a general agreement on March 7, after having overcome many difficulties, although twice during the course of mediation it was found necessary to extend

the period of truce. The formal signing of the documents took place on March 11.

Japan-Soviet Neutrality Pact

On March 12, the day after the successful conclusion of the above mentioned conference, Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, the then Foreign Minister, left Tokyo for an official visit to Germany and Italy. On the way, Mr. Matsuoka stopped at Moscow where he saw M. Joseph Stalin on the 24th. He arrived at Berlin two days later and there conversed with the chief officials of the German Government. Continuing his tour, the Foreign Minister reached Rome on the 31st, and during his stay at the Italian capital from April 1 to 3 he carried on conversations with the highest Italian authorities and also met the Pope. On the return trip, Moscow was revisited on April 7, and after having decided to extend his stay at the Soviet capital, Mr. Matsuoka held conversations with leading Soviet officials, the fruits of which finally appeared on April 13 in the form of the Japan-Soviet Neutrality Pact.

It had been a matter of common knowledge that a readjustment of Japanese-Soviet relations was expected with the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy in the summer of 1940. Since then, negotiations had been conducted between the Soviet and Japanese diplomatic authorities. These efforts were crowned with success on the occasion of Foreign Minister Matsuoka's visit to Europe.

To renew our appreciation of the importance of this Pact, its first article contains the provision for respecting the territorial integrity of the respective Powers as well as for non-aggression, while the second article provides for the promise that the contracting Powers shall observe strict neutrality if and when one of them is made an object of attack by a third Power. Furthermore, concurrently with the signing of this Pact, Soviet Russia and Japan recognised the territorial integrity of Manchoukuo and the People's Republic of Mongolia, respectively, with the assurance that neither of these states would be made an object of aggression. This, it was held, was a great step forward toward laying the foundations of peace in East Asia.

It is but natural that such an international development as the

conclusion of the Japan-Soviet Neutrality Pact should have been a serious blow to the Democratic Powers and particularly to the Chungking régime. On the other hand, however, there were many questions still unsettled between Japan and the Soviet Union, such as those relating to fisheries, the commercial treaty and others. In addition, with the aid-to-Chungking policy as its centre, the Soviet position in the China Affair was a very delicate one and, moreover, Japan-American relations were becoming more and more critical on account of Japan's southern policy, and altogether our prospects then were far from being bright.

Japan-French Indo-China Economic Agreement

In the wake of the peaceful entry of Japanese forces into French Indo-China in September, 1940, it was conceived that an economic negotiation should be held with a view to establishing new economic relations between Japan and the French colony. A conference for this purpose opened in Tokyo on December 30, 1940, and after five months of negotiations the Japan-French Indo-China Economic Agreement was signed on May 6, 1941.

Although an extended period of time was required for this agreement, due to the fact that the agenda covered all the wide and complex phases of economic relations, such as commerce, trade and customs, and that the mediation in the border dispute between Thailand and French Indo-China was carried on during the course of the negotiations, the conference was finally brought to a successful conclusion, thus succeeding in firmly establishing economic relations between Japan and French Indo-China. The new economic agreement contains the Convention of Establishment and Navigation and the Agreement concerning the Customs Tariff, Trade and Method of Payment.

It should be noted, particularly in connection with customs tariff that French Indo-China accorded Japan the most-favoured-nation treatment and allowed the importation of certain articles from Japan either duty free or at a minimum tariff. In the trade agreement also, Japan ensured such necessities as rice, maize and coal while French Indo-China was to acquire textiles and miscellaneous goods. In this connection a clearing system was established for the settlement of accounts and special consideration was given

to the matter of payment for rice. All these are manifestations of the special nature of the new economic relations between Japan and French Indo-China, upon which both countries are mutually dependent.

Visit of President Wang Ching-wei

Another outstanding event in Japan's foreign relations in the year under review was the official visit to Japan of Mr. Wang Ching-wei, President of the Republic of China and concurrently President of the Executive Yuan Having arrived in Tokyo on June 27, in his capacity as the President of the Chinese Republic, Mr. Wang Ching-wei proceeded to the Imperial Palace the following day to pay his respects to His Imperial Majesty. After the 19th, as President of the Executive Yuan, Mr. Wang carried on conversations with the Prime Minister, Foreign, War, Navy and Finance Ministers and on the 23rd, the Joint Statement of the Prime Minister, Prince Fumimaro Konoe, and the President of the Executive Yuan, Mr. Wang Ching-wei, was made public, marking a new epoch in the history of Sino-Japanese relations. Thus the Konoe Statement and the first Peace Statement have born fruit more than two years after their pronouncement, and the nurture and strengthening of the new Chinese Republic has advanced from the preparatory to the concrete stage. The significance of this Joint Statement could not be overlooked, since it was made clear that Japan's policy toward a solution of the China Affair remained unchanged, despite the emergence of the new situation occasioned by the Soviet-German War.

On June 28, the day of the return of President Wang Ching-wei to Nanking, the Japanese Government announced that they had decided to grant a 300,000,000 yen credit to the Nanking Government. Heretofore, the financial strength of the latter, although sufficient to enable the maintenance of the *status quo*, was considered to be somewhat inadequate for carrying out a large-scale programme of construction. With the 300,000,000 yen credit, it was now expected that the National Government would positively undertake the construction work which would lead to a rapid development of the new Government as local pacification work made headway.

Japan-Netherlands East-Indies Negotiations

While these developments had been taking place, the economic negotiations which had been in progress between Japan and the Netherlands East-Indies since 1940 were brought to a close by June 17.

Ambassador Kenkichi Yoshizawa, who arrived at Batavia toward the end of 1940 in place of Mr. Ichizo Kobayashi, undertook preliminary conversations from January 13, in the course of which he submitted a new proposal concerning the re-opening of negotiations. On the other hand, on February 1 the Netherlands Government in London instructed their Minister to Japan, General J.C. Pabst, to make representations to the Japanese Government to the effect that his Government was not in agreement with the Japanese conception of the position of the Netherlands East-Indies within the New Order of East Asia.

Thus, although thirteen preliminary negotiations and three official talks on matters of detail had been held between the representatives of the two countries since March 27, no substantial progress had been made since then. This deadlock in the negotiations was accounted for by the atmosphere created by the Japanese Foreign Minister's visit to Germany and Italy and the visit to the East-Indies of the Netherlands Foreign Minister, Mr. Van Kleffens.

At the time of capitulation of the Netherlands to Germany, the Colonial Government from its own independent position had revealed attitude which favoured a rational adjustment of the economic relations between the two countries in accordance with the principles of the New Order of East Asia. However, as the attitude of the United States and Great Britain, who together were in a position to encircle the Dutch East-Indies, gradually became apparent, the Dutch colony's attitude again hardened against Japan, even to the extent of showing their refusal to supply materials as they had already promised. In spite of this, the Japanese Government persevered in taking a broad view and all possible efforts were made for a satisfactory conclusion of the negotiations. But, finally realizing that all endeavours were in vain, the Japanese Government decided to bring the negotiations to a close and to withdraw their representatives. Thus, on June 8, Mr. Yoshizawa was ordered to return to Japan.

Recognition of the New Chinese Government by the Axis Powers

Early on the morning of June 22, Japan found herself faced with a new turn in her international relations by the commencement of Russo-German hostilities, but she at once decided to maintain a determined attitude, which was based upon her policy for achieving a speedy solution to the China Affair and the construction of a new order in East Asia as her primary objective. Meanwhile, on July 1, the five Axis Powers, namely Germany, Italy, Rumania, Slovakia and Croatia, formally recognized the National Government at Nanking. This was closely followed by similar actions on the part of Spain, Hungary and Bulgaria. As a result of this formal recognition by the Axis Powers, the international position of the new National Government made a great advance, a furtherance which contributed considerably toward the construction of the new order in East Asia.

The aforementioned 300,000,000 yen credit agreement with Japan together with this official recognition by the eight Axis Powers were two important achievements for the National Government and undoubtedly dealt a blow to the Chungking régime, which was foolishly continuing a futile war of resistance. Thus, various overseas organs of the Chungking régime, such as embassies, legations and other establishments which were located within the territory of the Axis Powers were henceforth to work as organs of the National Government. Also, with the establishment of friendly relations with France, Chinese traders in French Indo-China as well as in the South Seas region gradually clarified their stand and began to co-operate with the new National Government.

TOKYO GAZETTE

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CONCERNING THE PARTICIPATION OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA IN THE ANTI-COMINTERN PACT

—Statement of the Foreign Office Authorities Issued on
November 25, 1941—

As the National Government of the Republic of China have decided to participate in the Anti-Comintern Pact, the necessary procedures were completed today (November 25).

The National Government of China have long since realized that the activities of the Communist International are detrimental to the peace of the Far East, and thus Article 3 of the Basic Treaty between Japan and China, provided that the latter should cooperate with Japan for defence against the destructive activities of the Comintern.

It is most gratifying to the Imperial Government that the National Government of China have now adhered to the Anti-Comintern Pact.

CONCERNING THE NEW PARTICIPANTS IN THE ANTI-COMINTERN PACT

—Announcement by the Board of Information Made on
November 25, 1941—

In accordance with the procedure for adherence, newly provided in Article 2 of the Protocol concerning the extension of validity of the Anti-Comintern Pact, which was signed and sealed by the Plenipotentiaries of the six countries, namely, Japan, Germany, Italy, Manchoukuo, Hungary and Spain at Berlin on the 25th of November, 1941, seven countries, namely, China, Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland, Slovakia, Croatia and Denmark, have joined the Pact under today's date (November 25).

Doc 15554

CONCERNING THE CONCLUSION OF THE PROTOCOL
WITH RESPECT TO THE EXTENSION OF VALIDITY
OF THE ANTI-COMINTERN PACT

—Announcement by the Board of Information
Made on November 25, 1941—

SINCE the conclusion on November 25, 1936 between Japan and Germany of the Agreement against the Communist International—the so-called Anti-Comintern Pact—Italy adhered to it on November 6 of the following year (1937), as original signatory. She was then followed by Manchoukuo, Hungary and Spain, bringing the number of the participants to six countries, thus displaying its effectiveness. As the five-year period of the validity of the Agreement was about to expire, the Signatory Powers consulted among themselves, which resulted in an agreement of views to extend its validity for five more years. A new Protocol concerning the extension of validity of the Agreement was signed today, November 25, at Berlin between the plenipotentiaries of the six Powers, namely, Japan, Germany, Italy, Manchoukuo, Hungary and Spain.

It requires no reiteration that the Communist International, or the Comintern, with its world-wide organization, is carrying on disruptive machinations of communistic nature in all parts of the world. Accordingly, defence against such machinations must be of a world-wide scope. With the task of establishing a new order in East Asia as the basis of her national policy, Japan feels keenly the increasing necessity of safeguarding against the Comintern. That the Anti-Comintern Pact has accordingly been renewed, and that participation of countries, which will share similar intentions under the provisions of the new Protocol, is envisaged, is a source of profound congratulation.

The contents of the new Protocol are as follows:

PROTOCOL

The Government of the Empire of Japan, the Government of Germany, the Government of the Kingdom of Italy, the Government

Japanese version on Nov 26 1941
of Archie Shearmans

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of the Kingdom of Hungary, the Government of the Empire of Manchoukuo, and the Government of Spain;

Recognizing that the Agreement concluded between them for safeguarding against the activities of the Communist International has been most effective;

Believing firmly that the common interests of their countries require their close cooperation against the said common enemy, have decided to extend the period of validity of the above-mentioned Agreement, and have agreed upon the following provisions for the purpose:

ARTICLE 1

The Agreement against the Communist International consisting of the Agreement and the annexed Protocol of November 25, 1936, and the Protocol of November 6, 1937; and the Protocol of February 24, 1939, the Protocol of February 24, 1939, and the Protocol of March 27, 1939, by which Hungary, Manchoukuo and Spain respectively participated, shall be prolonged for five years beginning with November 25, 1941.

ARTICLE 2

The countries, which desire to participate in the said Agreement through the invitation by the Government of the Japanese Empire, Germany and the Italian Kingdom, shall communicate to the German Government by document the declaration of their participation; and the German Government shall notify the Governments of the other Signatories concerning the said communication. Such participation shall become effective from the day of the receipt by the German Government of the declaration of participation.

ARTICLE 3

The present Protocol shall be made in the Japanese, German and Italian languages and shall be the official texts of the respective countries. The present Protocol shall come into force from the day of its signature.

The Contracting Powers shall, at a suitable time, prior to the expiry of the five-year period stipulated in Article 1, come to an understanding concerning the method of their subsequent cooperation.

In faith whereof the undersigned, having been duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed the present Protocol and have affixed their seals thereto.

Tokyo Gazette Series No. 1

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Published by *Mitsuki Kohki, The Tokyo Gazette Publishing House, Zushikyo-ku,*
12, 3-chome, Marumori, Kojimachi-ku, Tokyo. Printed by K. Kaseki, the Kaseki-ya,
2 Kagurazaka 1-chome, Utsunomiya, Tokyo.

Annual Subscription including postage Nine Yen in Japan, Twelve Shillings in the British
Empire and Three Dollars in U.S.A.
75 sen, 1 shilling or 30 cents per copy.

昭和十七年一月一日 印刷 昭和十七年一月一日 發行
發行所 東京市麹町區丸之內三ノ一二番地丸の内 東京マセキ印刷所
郵便振替口座 東京市麹町區丸之內三ノ一二番地 丸の内
印刷所 東京市麹町區丸之內三ノ一二番地 丸の内
電話 東京市麹町區丸之內三ノ一二番地 丸の内

"Japanese Standard Size B5."